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Abstract: Primate research of the 20th century has established the validity of Darwin's postu-
lation of psychological as well as biological continuity between humans and other primates,
notably the great apes. Its data make clear that Descartes' view of animals as unfeeling
"beast-machines" is invalid and should be discarded. Traditional behavioristic frameworks -
that emphasize the concepts of stimulus, response, and reinforcement and an "empty-
organism" psychology - are in need of major revisions. Revised frameworks should incor-
porate the fact that, in contrast to the lifeless databases of the "hard" sciences, the database
of psychology entails properties novel to life and its attendant phenomena. The contributions
of research this century, achieved by field and laboratory researchers from around the world,
have been substantial -indeed revolutionary. It is time to celebrate the progress of our field, to
anticipate its significance, and to emphasize conservation of primates in their natural habitats.
Key words: learning, language, intelligence, emergent processes.
The literature of recent decades has revealed a
remarkably close relationship between humans
and the great apes (Pan, Gorilla. and Pongo:
see Napier & Napier, 1994: Sarich & Wilson.
1968: Turtle, 1986). Darwin's (1859, 1871) postu-
lation of psychological as well as biological
continuity between animals and humans has
been confirmed (Domjan, 1993, p. 391). It is
particularly important that this continuity is
advanced in the Western world, where the
Cartesian (Descartes. 1637. reprinted 1956)
view that animals have no sensibilities - that
animals are "'beast-machines." lacking reason.
consciousness, affect, intelligence, and language
- has been so influential. According to this
philosophy, humans, but not animals, were held
to have souls, which enabled them to think
and reason. Accordingly, humans could be held
accountable for their deeds. Human pain was
viewed as God's punishment for wrongdoings.
But because animals, sans souls, could not
be held accountable for their "'bad" behavior,
God was believed to protect them from feeling
pain under any condition. True, they might
act as though they suffered, but that was only
appearance. The experience of pain was
reserved for humans!
Western behaviorists have held that neither
humans nor animals have "agency. of action."
They do not enter actively into the deter-
mination of their behavior. Although the
Gestalt psychologists of Europe allowed for
Suooortee by grants from the Naiional Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD-06016), from the
National -A,eror'au%s Administratron tNAG2-438), arid by the College of Arts and Sciences, Georgia State University
The authors are grateful to Professor William A Hillix, San Diego State University, for his crttical reading of the
tvDescnot dunng _tspreparation.
© 1996 Jaoanese Psychological Association Publis_ect by Biackweil Publishers Lto, ]08 Cowley Road,
Oxforo OX4 1JE UK and 238 Main S[reet, CamiDncge, MA 02142, USA.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19970020723 2020-06-16T01:58:24+00:00Z
114 D M. Rumbaugh. E. S. Savage-Rumbaugh. and D. A. Washburn
cognition (that is, knowing, the creative cap-
acitv to reorganize perceptions and past learn-
ing to generate new solutions to problems), the
behaviorists looked to the reinforcement his-
tories of animals and to stimuli of the external
and internal environments to understand
behavior (see Mackintosh, 1994, for a review).
This research philosophy emulated that of
physics and chemistry, - the "hard" sciences -
that enjoyed substantially more respect and
prestige than psychology. It was as though psy-
chologists attributed the success of the other
sciences to their refutation of life variables,
and thus rejected life dimensions from their
own theory and methods to achieve "'standing"
for their science. In doing so. they failed to ack-
nowledge a major error: although the sources of
data for physics and chemistry are lifeless, the
very foundation of psychology's subject mate-
rial. behavior, is generated only by life - the
human and animal life of our world. Thus, the
data for psychology must be qualitatively dif-
ferent from the data of physics and chemistry.
If the philosophy of the early and even con-
temporary, "'empty-organism" psychology had
been limited to the building of a science of
behavior, its impact might have been appro-
priately limited. Regrettably, however, philo-
sophical concepts are readily reified. They
become "'real" and generalize inappropriately
to other domains. Thus, the empty-organism
philosophy of behaviorism appears to have
become viewed as valid by societies. In turn, it
might well have served to justify insensitive
practices, attitudes, and policies within socie-
ties. not only regarding animals, but for people
and the environment as well.
Behaviorism gained sway during the early
and mid-1900s as scientific, prestigious, valid,
and sufficient to the end of understanding all
behavior. Mackintosh (1994, p. 10) observed.
for example, that despite Tolman's several
strong differences and arguments with the psy-
chology of Hull and Thorndike, he did agree
with them that "'everything important in psy-
chology (except ... super-ego ... and matters
that involve society and words) can be
investigated in essence through the continued
experimental and theoretical analysis of the
determinants of rat behavior at a choice point
in a maze." Mackintosh also suggested that
Tolman likely could have counted on the sup-
port of Skinner if lever pressing were included
with choice behavior in mazes.
Mackintosh (1994) reaffirmed his own view
that it is now hard to believe that anyone would
have argued seriously that such research would
be of general value. Personally, we are now
incredulous that such a view would ever have
been seriously advanced. (The first author re-
calls his own days in graduate school and how
impressed he was by the perspectives of Hull,
Tolman, Skinner, and Guthrie: but times
change - and they should.)
Frankly, we are now advocating that; behav-
ioral primatologists re-examine all of the con-
structs and concepts of behaviorism that were
generated during the first three-quarters of
this century. We should do so because the per-
spectives, arguments, and conclusions of current
years have advanced well beyond the perspect-
ives of behaviorism, especially the postulate
that reinforcement is necessary for all learning,
and thus for most if not all behavior.
More progress has been made than we
frequently recognize. It is time to take stock
and celebrate the accomplishments of recent
decades that have altered or extended the
perspectives of historic behaviorism. Although
behavior will remain the basic focus of analysis,
we need to re-examine even our most basic
tenets and terms.
The null hypothesis
To begin this effort, let us consider a statistical
point - one that is essentially a general misuse
of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis
would postulate that "'no difference" exits be-
tween the psychological processes of humans
and animals. That hypothesis should be
rejected only when one's observations indicate
that "'a real difference" exists - one not attri-
butable to chance. By contrast, both we and
our audiences tend to begin with the conclusion
that real differences exist between the psycho-
logy of humans and animals and that the onus
is upon the researcher to prove that such is
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not the case! Indeed, we often assume that
these differences are so profound as to make it
impossible to compare the behavior of humans
to animals using similar methodologies, or to
extrapolate from animals to humans. (Parker,
in press, advances relevant perspectives.)
It bears noting that Darwin's postulate of
psychological as well as biological continuity
between animals and humans was an appro-
priate use of the null hypothesis, though he
did not know it by that name. He did not, of
course, argue for complete identity of proc-
ess, and neither should anyone. By definition,
other primates are not identical to us; but
because of the very, close genetic similarity be-
tween apes and humans (>98% shared DNA
between Pan and Homo; also see Andrews &
Martin, 1987: Sarich. 1983: Sibley & Alquist,
1987), there are grounds to anticipate impor-
tant similarities in their psychology as well as in
their neurobiology.
Rejection of the "beast-machine"
Recent behavioral research with primates has
produced abundant evidence against the Cart-
esian beast-machine concept and for Darwin's
postulations of continuity (Gibson & Ingold,
1993). Researchers from around the world,
working in the field and the laboratory, have
contributed overwhelming evidence of pri-
mates' capabilities for complex and malleable
systems of communication, symbolizing capaci-
ties, rule learning, number learning, counting,
drawing, and even language. This achievement
has been possible because of the spirit of
mutual respect that scientists have had for one
another's data. Behavioral research from Japan
(for example. Itani. 1979: Kano, 1989, 1992:
Kuroda. 1989: Matsuzawa, 1985, 1990; Nishida,
1989, 1990) has contributed significantly to the
formulation of the perspective that we advance
in this paper.
In contrast to the learning and behavioral
psychologists who studied animals in laborat-
ories in the United States during the heyday of
behaviorism, behavioral primatologists have
made revolutionary advances because they
have eschewed the "'empty organism" or "'empty
box" perspective. They know that species differ
multidimensionally and that genetic differences
create psychological differences both in the
simpler and in the more complex forms of
behavior. They see clearly that there are emer-
gent dimensions to behavior that are reflec-
tions of brain and cognitive evolutionary
processes. They know that primates are, in
measure, reflections of their early rearing and
environments and that early environment is
crucial to the development of normal, socially
competent primates. They do not have to be
persuaded that the roots of human biobehav-
ioral competence are traceable to our nonhu-
man primate relatives and that, to the degree
that there is a relationship between them and
between them and us, there are similarities
both in appearance and in behavior.
Brain, learning, and transfer
of learning
Allow us to discuss now some of the Language
Research Center's interests in the parameters
of human intelligence that can be traced to our
nearest living relatives - the great and lesser
apes, the monkeys of the New and Old Worlds,
and the prosimians. A long-standing tactic
for this study posited a relationship between
transfer of learning and brain complexity. Trans-
fer of learning was assessed through the use of
the transfer index (TI), a procedure designed
for equitable assessments of primates" complex
learning processes. Its design attenuates arti-
factual differences between species' learning
and performance that might be due to differ-
ences in their size, manual dexterity, attentive-
ness. and so on.
Research with 121 primate subjects of sev-
eral species relates their transfer-of-learning
skills to their brain complexity. Prior to test,
specific amounts or levels of learning were
established using procedures that brought
subjects to two levels of accuracy in a series of
visual discrimination learning problems - 67%
and 84% choices correct (see Rumbaugh &
Pate. 1984: Rumbaugh, in press, for details).
Figure 1 portrays the change in test perfor-
mance (percentage responses correct) as the
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Figure 1. The enhancement of transfer-of-learning in relation to brain complexity of primate (N = 121) is
po_rayed. The ranking of brain complexi W here offered correlates very highly both with the
"extra" neurons {96) and tissue (.98) afforded these species beyond that predicted by
brain-body allometr'f (see text). The vertical axis quantifies the change _n the i_ercentage of
res0onses that are correct as a result of the pre-transfer test learning criterion being increased
from 67% to 84% correct, Each point on the baseline is for a particular s0ecies, except for the
one {far rigt_t) that is for five language-competent chimpanzees and bonobos of the Language
Research Center. Their enhanced performance is probably the result of _he ennchment afforded
by .:heir research participation and their language skills. {See Acknowledgments for contributions
of unpublished data from others. See Cooper (1980) and De Lillo and Visalberghi (1994) as
sources for data on Phaner, Microcebus, and Capuchin Other unDublished capuchin data were
contributed by Drs. Wilham Hopkins and Stephen Suomi. Laboratory for Comparattve Ethology,
the National Institutes of Health.)
amount of pre-test learning was increased from
the 67% to the 84% level. It should be noted
that as the amount of learning was increased.
the prosimians and smaller monkeys generally
tended to do worse on discrimination reversal
tests. Increased learning handicapped their
performance on transfer tests. By contrast, the
great apes and even the larger monkeys with
more complex brains did better on their trans-
fer tests as the degree of pre-test learning was
increased. Thus, an important qualitative shift
across species was documented in transfer skills
and the amount of learning that they were
permitted to acquire prior to tests of transfer.
There was a high and positive rank order
correlation (Spearman r = .79) between our
rank ordering of brain complexity and ability
to transfer. This ranking bv brain complexity
subsequently was found to correlate highly with
Jerison's (personal communication) estimation
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of the "'extra brain volume" (.96) and his
calculations of "'extra neurons" (.98). "'Extra"
here is in reference to the amount of extra
brain and extra neurons afforded by enceph-
alization processes that have enlarged primate
brains beyond that predicted bv allometric
relationships between brain and" body sizes
for mammals. Average body weights and
brain weights per species correlated highly
with each other (.96): bodv weight correla-
ted highly with transfer-of-learning proficiency
(.88): and brain weight per species also corre-
lated highly with transfer skills (.84). Thus,
for primates, a large bodv means a dispropor-
tionately large brain and hence a greater
quantity of "'extra" neurons, which, in turn,
correlate highly with the values obtained
from the y-axis of Figure [ (extra brain volume.
r = .82: and extra neurons, r = .79). If elab-
oration of the frontal lobes was made possible
bv reason of this "extra" volume, transfer of
training could be enhanced through the inhi-
bition of responses that otherwise would pro-
duce perseveration and errors.
Jerison's (1985) encephalization coefficient.
relating brain weight to body weight, is only
generally correlated with the body weights of
the primate species used here. and thus did not
correlate significantly with transfer skills. Both
the diminutive squirrel monkey (Saimiri) and
talapoin have higher encephalization coeffi-
cients than does the massive gorilla, while they
are substantiallv below the gorilla in their
complex learning and transfer skills.
In the earlv 1970s, the first author reported
evidence for qualitative differences in the
learning processes of nonhuman primates (see
Rumbaugh & Pate. 1984). A current inter-
pretation of those data holds that there is a
general emergence of relational learning (rather
than simpler, associative stimulus-response
learning) as the primate brain evolves in
size and complexity. This change, along with
the qualitative shift from negative to positive
transfer, as measured bv methods relevant to
Figure 1. documents how emery, eat processes
of adaptation are afforded bv brain evolution.
It was because of these kinds of data that, when
the LANA Project (Rumbaugh. 1977) was
initiated by the first author in 1971. an ape -
not a monkey - was selected as a subject.
Apes and language: a brief review
The readers of this journal are probably famil-
iar with the accomplishments of researchers
with respect to issues of apes and language
potential. Notwithstanding. a brief review of
selected results from our own studies will
support the perspective advanced in this paper.
Project work with Lana (Pan troglodytes;
see Rumbaugh, 1977) afforded the following
results. (1) It proved the efficacy of using
lexigram-embossed, computer-monitored keys
that we have now used for the past 24 years,
in that Lana readily learned about 250 word-
lexigrams (i.e., geometric patterns) on her key-
board and how to sequence them in accordance
with the rules of grammar that had been pro-
grammed into the computer that controlled the
operations of her keyboard and various vend-
ing devices. (2) It provided evidence of Lana's
ability to build upon and to make novel use of
stock sentences, which she first learned through
operant training methods, to solve new prob-
lems. (3) It demonstrated that Lana's perform-
ance in cross-modal perceptual tasks was
facilitated when the objects had names.
In spite of Lana's several remarkable achieve-
ments, she did not provide an answer to the
question of fundamental importance - what is
language? In response to obvious need for us
to pursue our own answer to this question, the
second author of this paper initiated Project
Sherman and Austin (/_ troglodytes: see Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1986). Sherman and Austin's data
contributed to the answering of this question.
(1) Words have several distinct functions that
support symbolic communication. The skills en-
tailed in making a request are different from
those entailed in the naming or labeling of things.
(2) Words are more than the associations
of symbols with things and events. For a svmbol
to be a word, there must be comprehension
both when the symbol is used and when it is
received. Comprehension is not necessarily
instated bv the skills of either requesting or
naming.
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(3) Comprehension seemingly is based on
long-term coordination of social behavior
through the use of symbols. Through working
on a variety of tasks, such as those that entailed
joint attention and complying with one another's
requests for specific foods and tools. Sherman
and Austin became adept at understanding lexi-
grams as well as at requesting and naming items.
(4) As Sherman and Austin mastered their
tasks, they extended their skills to new func-
tions. Perhaps the most impressive was their
formulation of statements about what they were
about to do and/or what food or drink they
would retrieve from an array just surveyed in
another room.
(5) Consistent with the framework that we
advance here. emergent operations afforded
Sherman and Austin new and impressive com-
petencies, ones neither specifically the target of
training nor anticipated by the research team.
(6) The categorization skills of Sherman and
Austin indicated that they had a basic capacity
for semantics. These skills were manifest in an
experiment where, in final test. they correctly
classified all but one of 17 word-lexigrams
(that represented various foods and tools)
through use of two lexigrams, one standing
for tool and the other for food. In this situa-
tion Sherman and Austin used their word-
lexigrams, not to request or name items, but
only to categorize them. Their skill in so doing
clearly indicates the representational dimen-
sions of semantics that the symbols had for
Sherman and Austin.
More recent findings have emerged that
even we would not have thought possible
t0 vears ago (Savage-Rumbaugh, Murphy,
Sevcik. Brakke. Williams. & Rumbaugh. 1993).
Apes can learn, without formal training, to
understand the semantics and even the mean-
ing of human speech at a level that compares
favorably with that of a 2-3-year-old child.
The ape's comprehension of spoken words is
assessed bv its competence in selecting the
appropriate referent for single words that it
hears in controlled experimental situations. Its
comprehension of meaning is assessed by its
capacity to carry, out novel sentences of request
that it hears.
Kanzi's (Pan paniscus) comprehension of
over 600 novel sentences of request was very
comparable to Alia's. a 2'/.-year-old child. Both
carried out the requests without assistance for
approximately 70% of the sentences. Kanzi
was exposed to language training between the
ages of 6 and 30 months, while present during
his adoptive mother's (Matata) daily training
sessions. Matata never benefitted substantially
from that training. (Matata had been brought
to the Yerkes Regional Primate Research
Center, Emory University, from the wilds of
Zaire for reproductive biomedical research
in the early 1970s; perhaps it was because of
her having been reared in the ways of the
forest that she never succeeded in language
acquisition.)
Matata's failure, however, in no way impeded
Kanzi in his spontaneous language acquisition.
His skills were manifested when Matata was
sent to the Yerkes Field Station for breeding. It
was only then, when he was about 2_ years old,
that his language training program was to begin.
That program was never implemented, how-
ever. It was unnecessary. Kanzi already knew
what Matata had been intended to learn. In
sum:
(1) Kanzi's language skills appeared spon-
taneously, without formal training. The course
of Kanzi's language development was, first,
comprehension of speech and the use of
lexigrams by others. His skills of production
emerged naturally from this language base and
involved the use of both lexigrams and gestures
(Greenfield & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991, 1993).
(2) His comprehension skills included the
ability to understand novel sentences of request
as well as single words.
(3) It is suggested that the bonobo's capacity
for human language is latent and that in the
wild it provides for other complex capacities,
that are perhaps relevant to language in ways
that are not yet clear to us - or that perhaps
are language. Savage-Rumbaugh. Williams,
Furuichi. and Kano (in press) have reported
that the bonobos of Wamba. Zaire. use vegeta-
tion to mark. so as to inform other bonobos
who follow, the path they have taken at points
where their trails divide.
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Language acquisition and the
logic structure of the environment
The course of language acquisition (Bates. 1993)
for the normal human child is, first, compre-
hension (i.e.. understanding), then production
(i.e., speech). Most of the basics of language
are acquired spontaneously, that is, without
formal training.
Kanzi is the first ape to have acquired lan-
guage competence in this manner. He first
came to understand speech and then to
generate his "'utterances" through use of his
word-lexigrams and gestures (Greenfield &
Savage-Rumbaugh. 1991. 1993). Kanzi's oppor-
tunities for the spontaneous acquisition of
language came not through formal training, but
through his daily observations of the language
instruction given to his mother.
Thus. we argue that it was his extensive
opportunities to observe the reliable, predict-
able, meaningful, consistent, and communica-
tive patterns of "'language instruction" offered
his mother that afforded him "spontaneous"
language acquisition, A summary way of
capturing this conclusion is to say:
(1) that it was through Kanzi's reliable access
to the patterned experiences afforded by
the logic strttctz,re of his environment (e.g..
the speech of the experimenters and their
use of word-lexigrams on a keyboard that
structured his mother's instructional ses-
sions) that
(2) he perceptually discerned and learned the
relationships between symbols and events
that provided for him the basic processes
and competencies with language.
Kanzi's observational learning of complex
abilities also extends to the making of stone
tools (Toth, Schick. Savage-Rumbaugh, Sevcik,
& Rumbaugh. 1993). Given the opportunity to
observe a professional flint-knapper, Kanzi
learned of stone tools- of their use, value, and
means of production. He makes stone tools
and does so with good sense. He assesses his
flint chips for sharpness and. quite appropriately,
makes larger chips to cut thick cables of rope
and smaller ones to cut thin ones.
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Co-rearing of a bonobo and a chimpanzee
Because all of our common chimpanzees
(P. troglodytes) had required formal training
for the instatement of their language skills
and had manifested only minimal speech com-
prehension, a co-rearing study of a bonobo
(Panbanisha) and a common chimpanzee
(Panzee) was undertaken to determine whether
Kanzi's achievement was specific to his species
(Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991: Savage-Rumbaugh,
Brakke, & Hutchins. 1992: Savage-Rumbaugh
& Lewin, 1994).
By the age of 2'/. years, both subjects came
to understand single words and the meanings
of lexigrams for both comprehension and
production, though Panbanisha's skills were
substantially greater than Panzee's. Thus the
bonobo probably excels in language skills
relative to the common chimpanzee: for both
species, however, it is in the logic structure of
the infants" environments that their complex
abilities, competencies, and dimensions of intel-
ligence and expression are optimally formed.
Their formation is behaviorally "'silent" (e.g.,
not observable) in that their expression might
not occur until the age of 2 years or older. The
language skills both of Panbanisha and Panzee
were highlighted by speech comprehension,
an ability never established via the training
protocols of our prior work with chimpanzees.
Early impoverished environmental effects
Early environmental stimulation can have
general facilitating effects upon development.
[t is in the logic structure of the early environ-
ment. however, that the basic vectors of cogni-
tive competence are formed. An important
corollary of this important principle is that the
specific effects of the logic structure probably
depend on brain size and complexity. Early
environment is probably much more critical to
the great apes than to monkeys and prosimians
with regard to the likelihood of specific emerg-
ent processes (e.g.. language and speech com-
prehension) being formed quietly bv the
infant's reliable interaction with the logic
structures of its environment.
This point is made even clearer when it is
recalled that studies in the 1960s and 1970s
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documented that chimpanzees subjected to
impoverished rearing even during only the first
two years of infancy are both socially and cog-
nitively deficient for complex learning and the
transfer of learning some 12 years later, as adults
(Davenport. Rogers, & Rumbaugh, 1973).
Appropriate language-structured rearing
instated in the ape what none of the earlier
efforts designed to teach apes specific language
skills through use of tutorials could, namely the
ability to comprehend speech and its syntax.
That style of rearing also served to instate
spontaneously appearing productive language
skills that approximate those of a 1Z-year-old
normal child.
Rhesus monkeys in comparative
perspective
At this juncture, we must direct our discussion
to monkevs, for a new perspective on their
competencies has been established through
the development of the Language Research
Center's Computerized Test System (LRC-C'TS;
Rumbaugh. Richardson, Washburn, Savage-
Rumbaugh. & Hopkins. 1989: Richardson.
Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, &
Rumbaugh, 1990: Washburn. Hopkins, &
Rumbaugh. 1989). This system has not only
been a successful automation of the Wisconsin
General Test Apparatus (Washburn et al.. 1989).
but it also has afforded us and dozens of other
laboratories around the world an economical
system for research into questions limited only
by the researcher's vision and imagination.
Notwithstanding the judgment that monkeys
have an order of smartness or intelligence that
is substantially below that of the apes, at least
the larger ones are impressive. Research at the
Language Research Center has defined their
precision use of a joystick in a battery of com-
plex tasks designed to measure learning, mem-
o_', vigilance, eye-hand coordination, planning.
relative value judgments, and so on. For the
purposes of this paper it suffices to list the
following:
(t) Rhesus" performance on the transfer
index is impressively high and, coupled with
the number of trials which they work each day,
accurately predicts training success on the com-
prehensive battery, of tasks referenced above
(Washburn & Rumbaugh. 1994).
(2) Rhesus shift their object-discrimination
learning from stimulus-response associative to
more advanced relational processes as a func-
tion of protracted experience in the LRC-CTS
(Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992a).
(3) Rhesus work better when they can
choose tasks on which to work than they do
when those same tasks are otherwise assigned,
and they prefer to work for rewards rather
than to receive them passively, "for free"
(Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992b).
(4) Rhesus are "'super-learners.'" They read-
ily learned the relative values of the numeral
set 0-9, even though they did not have to
choose the larger number in order to get pellets
(Washburn & Rumbaugh. 1991). Even on novel
test trials, on which certain pairings of numer-
als were presented for the first time. they reli-
ably picked the number with the greater pellet
value.
(5) Handedness by rhesus in joystick manip-
ulation is strongly established. Right-handed
monkeys tend to be more facile learners than
left-handed monkeys (Hopkins, Washburn,
Berke, & Williams. 1992).
(6) Rhesus monkeys manifest many charac-
teristics of selective attention similar to those
of humans. For instance, thev are sensitive to
the Stroop-like interference when quantities,
between which they are to differentiate, com-
prise Arabic numbers (Washburn, 1994).
(7) Rhesus are predictor-operators in tasks
where they must anticipate the collision
courses of two images, one of which is under
their direct control (Washburn & Rumbaugh,
1992c). They "'shoot" at where a target will be
and "'chase" to head targets off at points where
they will be by the time the image under the
monkev's control can intercept it.
(8) Rhesus monkeys, like humans, can indi-
cate when they are uncertain in making choices
and do so generally at times that are appropri-
ate (Schull. Smith. Washburn. & Shields, 1994).
(9) The vast majority of independent vari-
ables studied to date in our laboratory have
the same effects upon rhesus performance as
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they do in task performance by humans (e.g..
Washburn, Hopkins, & Rumbaugh. 1990).
A new perspective on basic
concepts
It is now clear that Descartes was wrong.
Descartes' beast-machine model of animals has
been discredited and should no longer influ-
ence the thinking and values of our societies.
We also conclude that the well known Amer-
ican advocates of behaviorism were more than
just incomplete in their psychologies - they
were quite possibly wrong in significant and
fundamental ways. It is timely that we consider
revisions of some of our most basic concepts.
To that end. we offer the following perspective
of: learning, reinforcement, stimuli, responses,
and continua and emergent processes.
Learning
Research methods served to emphasize, and
even to equate, learning with a change in be-
havior. Changes in behavior are necessary for
learning to be inferred, but learning of even
complex forms can be established in the
absence of overt, observable motor responses.
Evidence for this argument includes the fact
that language acquisition by apes reared in a
language-structured environment is silent in
that there might be no bases for inferring
speech and lexigram comprehension until they
are about 2 years of age or even older.
Collaborative research by W. K. Richardson.
D. A. Washburn and D. M. Rumbaugh with
rhesus monkeys provides important findings in
support of this view of learning. Initial training
consisted of having the subject use a foot to
manipulate a joystick to solve an interactive
video-formatted task. The task required that
the subject move the cursor to make it collide
with an erratically moving target. Once this
skill was acquired and the monkey was allowed
for theflrst time to use its hand to operate the
joystick, it did substantially better than it bad
ever done with its foot. Its learning was not
in the use of the muscle groups to perform
the task: rather, its learning was about the
demands of the task and how those demands
might be met - initially with the foot, but later
more competently with its hand. Here, learning
is not properly viewed as "'responses with the
foot". Rather. learning is more accurately
viewed as "'about the task" (in this context,
"'direct the cursor into contact with the moving
target"). Reinforcement of specific muscle
groups was irrelevant.
We suspect that, guided by biological pro-
clivities and constraints, organisms tend to
perceive relationships, especially new ones,
between all kinds of events, objects, foods,
barriers, and so on (Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde,
1973: Ristau, 199h Roitblat. Bever, & Terrace,
1984). Organisms are always exposed to
stimuli, including the previously mentioned
items, across time. In particular, primates (and
notably the great apes and humans) have
brains that probably excel at processes of
ordering, relating, and categorizing things that
they sense and things that they perceive. This
orientation directs learning to the perception
of relationships rather than to the reinforce-
ment of specific responses, except to the degree
that there is a relationship defined between the
execution of a specific response and the pro-
curement of a specific reinforcement. From this
perspective, "reinforcers" become resources
and are managed from a "'resource manage-
ment" perspective. (Pay checks sustain our
efforts but only rarely shape or declare highly
specific behaviors.)
Thus, learning may be "'latent" (in place, but
not evidenced) or it may be "'silent" for long
periods. But, nonetheless, it can be there. When
the requisite conditions for its recall and appli-
cation are encountered, the learning is called
upon and becomes a valuable tool to help
with the continuing effort to achieve optimal
adaptation.
Reinforcement
Reinforcement generally has been viewed as
something that strengthens the probability
of responses and as a requisite for learning.
Indeed, the emphasis on reinforcement has
been so great that the ready conclusion is at
hand that for every observed behavior there
must be a reinforcement history.
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Admittedly. reinforcement is generally sali-
ent and can have a major impact upon behavior
in that it is generally necessary if a given
behavior is to be sustained. Complex language
competence can be instated basically by
allowing apes to observe events in a language-
structured rearing environment, where specific
motor responses by them are not entailed be-
cause of their motoric immaturity. Therefore,
"'reinforcement" is perhaps more completely
defined as an element to be related percept-
ually by the infants to other events than it
is to something which inherently strengthens
foregoing responses.
We should explore the wisdom of viewing
"reinforcement" as information or as a re-
source that can be accessed when needed - if
the requisite behaviors are utilized. Learning
and behavior can be viewed, then, as means
whereby organisms access the resources, the
reinforcements of their environments in the
struggle to achieve optimal levels of adapta-
tion, given the time and energy budgets which
can be expended.
Stimufi
Stimuli have been generally defined as changes
in the strength of some energy source, be it
internal or external. There is no doubt that
such changes tend to attract attention and to
generate responses. In addition, however, some
stimuli are defined or instated by the subject.
Thus. whenever it is clear that a "'stimulus"
is inherently a relationship between things
(whether they be stimuli, responses, reinfor-
cers, or other), we should remember that it was
the subject's psychology and neurobiology -
not reinforcement per se - that induced or
inferred the relationship to which behavior is
now being directed.
Responses
Responses have been generally viewed as
rather specific motor patterns. It is now clear
that they also can be far more general in that
thev can be "'task-completion'" designed. Thev
also might be primarily perceptual and cogni-
tive rather than motoric. They perhaps are
more accuratelv viewed as the natural products
of a complex brain, notably those of primates.
to organize adaptive action patterns given the
options and constraints of the present context
as modulated by both past and present exper-
ience. The organization of adaptive action
patterns can be based even on the observation
of various relationships between the actions
of others and ensuing events. And it should
be noted that this form of learning is one of
patterns of goal-directed behaviors, not of
specific responses.
Continua and emergent processes
The complexities of life are the expressions
of continua in multiple interactions. The evolu-
tion of brain in size and complexity and in
relation to the body's characteristics; the
evolution of perceptual systems: the evolution
of refined motor systems; the protraction
of periods of pregnancy and development;
modulations on social structures compelled by
environmental resources and energy budgets
which address the various challenges of staying
alive: and other dimensions of evolution beyond
the scope of this discussion all provide for the
emergence of new processes, new abilities,
new behaviors and even new psychologies
(Rumbaugh. Washburn. & Hillix, in press). No
psychology built on data of a single species in
a constrained study situation, be it a maze. an
operant chamber, or other problem situation,
can be adequate to our need to cope with the
changes referenced.
Summary
In contrast to physics and chemistry, the data
obtained bv behavioral primatologists and by
psychologists come exclusivelv from entities
that are distinguished by the fact that they have
life. New perspectives of behavior must incor-
porate this fact and. in some manner, develop a
language system which takes into account the
probability that all animal forms, and notably
the primates, have
(1) a sense of being that pertains to manv
dimensions of their lives
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(2) a knowledge-based assessment of their
environment: and
(3) an assessment of their capabilities and
what it is that they might be able to do
(Rumbaugh & Savage-Rumbaugh. 1994).
These sources of information and estimation
are used to achieve, as far as possible, success-
ful adaptation and reproduction.
Behavioral primatologists have reason to
proceed with confidence that Darwin was cor-
rect in his postulations of psychological as well
as biological continuities between animals and
humans. Accordingly, if there is a compelling
reason for us to accept the value of a process or
construct for understanding human behavior,
we should not rule out the probability that
traces thereof can be discerned at the non-
human level (Bates, Thai, & Marchman, 1991;
Bruner, 1972: Domjan, 1993: Goodall, 1986;
King, 1994; Koehler, 1925: Krasnegor, Rum-
baugh, Schiefelbusch, & Studdert-Kennedy,
1991: Menzel, 1979: Roitblat, Herman, &
Nachtigall, 1993: Tuttle, 1986). To do so is
not to call for either an anthropocentric or an
anthropomorphic framework or approach.
Rather it is to assert a logical implication of
continuities in psychological processes until data
compel us to accept, for a specific operation,
otherwise.
The future will likely reveal that much of the
perspective advanced herein for primates holds.
in measure, for many other forms of life as well.
One certainly must be intrigued with that pos-
sibility, given all that behavioral primatologists
have learned - most of which could not have
been imagined even a few decades ago.
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